This piece is part of my “Arguments” series. In this collection of posts, I examine and respond to some of the most common arguments used to defend the exploitation of animals or to criticise veganism.
These articles are not intended to be exhaustive treatments of each topic. Rather, they are designed as practical reference pieces, helping readers reflect on these arguments more carefully and respond to them in a thoughtful, informed way.
You can find other entries in this series here.
The Claim
This argument usually goes like this:
- Farmed animals exist because humans breed them.
- Therefore, it is acceptable to exploit and kill aniamls for food.
At first glance, this may seem straightforward. If animals would not exist without human intervention, perhaps we are entitled to decide their purpose. However, the conclusion does not logically follow from the premise.
The Short Answer
Breeding animals for food does not give humans moral authority over their lives and deaths.
Creating a sentient being does not entitle us to decide that their purpose is to be exploited and killed. Once animals exist, they have their own interests in avoiding harm and continuing to live, regardless of why they were bred.
Assigning a purpose from the outside does not override those interests. History shows that imposing roles on others has often been used to justify serious injustice.
The fact that we celebrate rescued farmed animals also reveals that most people already recognise this. We intuitively understand that animals are more than the functions we assign to them. The ethical question is not why animals were bred. It is whether killing them is justified now that they exist as sentient individuals.
The Detail
Creating an Individual Does Not Determine Their Purpose
The fact that humans breed animals does not establish that we are morally entitled to determine their purpose.
This reasoning assumes that bringing a sentient being into existence grants the creator ownership over that being’s life and death. That assumption is difficult to justify.
In moral philosophy, sentient beings are generally understood to have interests of their own, independent of the purposes others assign to them (1, 2). The ability to experience pleasure, pain, fear, and preference gives rise to morally relevant interests, including an interest in continued life and in avoiding harm.
If an individual has interests, then imposing a purpose that conflicts with those interests requires justification. Simply stating that “we created them” does not provide that justification.
The Problem of Imposed Purpose
Throughout history, humans have often assumed the authority to define the “purpose” of others. Enslavement, forced labour, and rigid gender roles were all defended, in part, on the basis that certain groups were naturally suited, or bed, for particular functions.
These cases are not identical to animal agriculture, and each form of oppression has its own context. However, they illustrate a broader moral principle: Assigning purpose to others does not automatically make that assignment ethically legitimate.
The core issue is autonomy. While non-human animals do not possess the same intellectual capacity as humans, they are autonomous in the sense that they pursue their own goals, avoid harm, and act according to their preferences.
Moral philosophers such as Tom Regan argue that beings who are “subjects-of-a-life” possess inherent value and should not be treated merely as means to others’ ends (1). Peter Singer, working from a utilitarian perspective, argues that like interests should be weighed equally, regardless of species (2).
On either account, breeding animals for slaughter requires more than just the assertion that it was always our intention for an animal to be exploited.
Would Non-Existence Be Worse?
Some defenders of this argument suggest that farmed animals benefit from being brought into existence, and therefore cannot be wronged by being killed.
This raises a complex philosophical issue. It may be true that existence can be a benefit, but once an individual exists and has developed interests, including an interest in continued life, ending that life contradicts those interests. The fact that someone would not have existed otherwise does not mean they have no moral standing once they do exist.
Otherwise, we would have to accept that exploiting any individual who was created excplictly for the purpose of being exploited cannot be wrong, so long as their existence depends on that exploitation. Most people would find this conclusion deeply troubling.
Inconsistencies in Application
There is also an inconsistency in how this reasoning is applied.
When animals escape slaughterhouses, are rescued from laboratories, or are adopted from farms into sanctuaries, these stories are widely celebrated. Rarely does anyone argue that such animals should be returned to fulfil their “purpose.”
If we genuinely believed that being bred for food determined an animal’s moral destiny, we would condemn these rescues. Instead, most people intuitively recognise that these animals have interests beyond the roles assigned to them, and we cheer them on when they manage to escape the deaths that they were bred for. This recognition weakens the original claim.
Species Designation and Moral Value
Designating one group of animals as “food” and another as “companions” does not alter their underlying capacities for suffering or enjoyment.
A pig raised on a farm and a pig living in a sanctuary share the same cognitive and emotional capacities (3). Their moral value does not change because of the arbitrary label we apply to them.
The argument that “they were bred for it” ultimately rests on species membership and human preference, rather than on a morally relevant difference between individuals.
Summary
The claim that animals are bred to be eaten does not, by itself, justify eating them.
Bringing a sentient being into existence does not grant moral authority to end that being’s life. Assigning a purpose does not override an individual’s interests. Once animals exist as sentient beings, their capacity to suffer and their interest in continued life become morally relevant.
If we celebrate animals who escape exploitation, we implicitly acknowledge that their value is not determined by the purpose we assigned to them. The ethical question is not why they were bred, but whether killing them is justified now that they exist.
Bibliography
- Regan, T. (2004). The Case for Animal Rights. University of California Press.
- Singer, P. (2011). Practical Ethics (3rd ed.). Cambridge University Press.
- Marino, L., & Colvin, C. (2015). Thinking Pigs: A Comparative Review of Cognition, Emotion, and Personality in Sus domesticus. International Journal of Comparative Psychology, 28.
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/8sx4s79c
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